Dato: 27. september 2022
Når: 11.30 – 13.00
Hvor: Auditoriet, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Akersveien 26, 0177 Oslo.
Foredragsholder: Maxwell Kellogg
Abstract: While the U.S. Disability Insurance (DI) system is large in terms of fiscal costs and beneficiary rolls, its interactions with household self-insurance mechanisms are not well-understood. In addition to crowding out the insurance value of DI, household self-insurance may drive negative selection into DI by reducing the implicit costs that stem from its lengthy application process. Allowing for such interactions in a rich life cycle model, this paper finds that revenue-neutral expansionary DI reforms do not necessarily improve welfare, as benefits often accrue to individuals with stronger self-insurance capacity. However, an asset test can reduce negative selection on the basis of household self-insurance capacity, to the extent that expansionary reforms become welfare-improving. Finally while household self-insurance crowds out the value of DI expansions, abstracting away from insurance value can still lead to erroneous conclusions regarding their overall and relative welfare effects.
Tid: 11.45 – 12.45
Servering av kaffe/te og baguetter fra 11.30.